A federal appeals court has ruled that an SEC
regulation on fixed index annuities, while reasonably adopted, did
not take into account its effect on efficiency, competition and
capital formation. In Rule 151A, the SEC removed fixed indexed
annuities from the exemption for annuity contracts bestowed by
Securities Act Section 3(a)(8) and placed them under Commission
regulation. In vacating Rule 151A, a panel of the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the SEC’s consideration of the effect of the
rule on efficiency, competition and capital formation, as required
by the Securities Act, was arbitrary and capricious. However, the
SEC’s decision to regulate fixed indexed annuities and not allow
them to rely on the Section 3(a)(8) exemption was a reasonable
interpretation of an ambiguous statute.
A fixed index annuity is a hybrid financial product.
Unlike traditional fixed annuities, the purchaser’s rate of return
is not based upon a guaranteed interest rate. In fixed index
annuities, the insurance company credits the purchaser with a return
that is based on the performance of a securities index, such as the
Dow Jones Industrial Average. Depending on the performance of the
securities index to which a particular annuity is tied, the return
on a fixed index annuity might be much higher or lower than the
guaranteed rate of return offered by a traditional fixed annuity.
Section 929J of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act would
essentially preempt federal securities regulation of equity indexed
annuities.
The SEC adopted Rule 151A in order to clarify the
status under the federal securities laws of indexed annuities, under
which payments to the purchaser are dependent on the performance of
a securities index. The rule defines indexed annuities as not being
annuity contracts under the 3(a)(8) exemption if the amounts payable
by the insurer under the contract are more likely than not to exceed
the amounts guaranteed under the contract.
Finding the rulemaking process defective, the appeals
panel rejected as flawed the SEC’s reasoning that adopting Rule 151A
would enhance competition by resolving the current uncertainty over
the legal status of fixed index annuities. The panel said that the
lack of clarity resulting from the uncertain legal status of a
financial product is only another way of saying that there was not a
regulation in place before the adoption of Rule 151A.
In the court’s view, the SEC cannot justify the
adoption of a particular rule based solely on the assertion that the
existence of a rule provides greater clarity to an area that
remained unclear in the absence of any rule. Whatever rule the SEC
chose to adopt could equally be said to make the previously
unregulated market clearer than it would be without that adoption.
The fact that federal regulation of fixed index annuities would
bring clarity to this area of the law is not helpful in assessing
the effect that Rule 151A has on competition.
While creating a rule that resolves the uncertain
legal status of fixed index annuities might be said to improve
competition, the court said that conclusion could be asserted
regardless of whether the rule deems such instruments to fall within
the SEC’s regulatory reach or outside of it. The court said the SEC
would achieve a similar clarity if it declined to regulate fixed
index annuities. The Securities Act test does not ask for an
analysis of whether any rule would have an effect on competition.
Rather, it asks for an analysis of whether the specific rule the SEC
adopted will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
The SEC’s reasoning with respect to competition supports at most the
conclusion that any SEC action in this area could promote
competition, the court noted, but does not establish Rule 151A’s
effect on competition.
The SEC’s competition analysis also failed because the
SEC did not make any finding about the existing level of competition
in the marketplace under the state law regime. The SEC asserted that
competition would increase based upon its expectation that Rule 151A
would require fuller public disclosure of the terms of fixed index
annuities and thereby increase price transparency. The SEC could not
accurately assess any potential increase or decrease in competition,
however, because it did not assess the baseline level of price
transparency and information disclosure under state law.
The court said the SEC’s analysis of the efficiency of
Rule 151A was similarly arbitrary and capricious. The SEC concluded
that Rule 151A would promote efficiency because the required
disclosures under the rule would enable investors to make more
informed investment decisions about purchasing indexed annuities.
The panel found that the SEC’s analysis was incomplete because it
failed to determine whether, under the existing regime, sufficient
protections existed to enable investors to make informed investment
decisions and sellers to make suitable recommendations to investors.
The court said the SEC’s failure to analyze the
efficiency of the existing state law regime rendered arbitrary and
capricious the SEC’s judgment that applying federal securities law
would increase efficiency. This flawed efficiency analysis also
rendered the capital formation analysis arbitrary and capricious.
The SEC’s conclusion that Rule 151A would promote capital formation
was significantly based on the flawed presumption that the enhanced
investor protections under Rule 151A would increase market
efficiency, but the court said this analysis fell with the failure
of its underlying premise.
The court also held that the SEC’s interpretation of
an ambiguous statute was based in reason. By their nature, fixed
index annuities appeal to the purchaser not on the usual insurance
basis of stability and security but on the prospect of growth
through sound investment management. While a fixed index annuity is
akin to an annuity contract with respect to its pay-in and
guaranteed minimum value of purchase payment features, it is more
like a security in that the index-based return of a fixed index
annuity is not known until the end of a crediting cycle, as the rate
is based on the actual performance of a specified securities index
during that period. Fixed index annuities, like securities, have
variability in the potential return that results in a risk to the
purchaser. By contrast, an exempt annuity contract avoids this
variability by guaranteeing the interest rate ahead of time.
In the court’s view, Rule 151A is the SEC’s means of
ensuring greater protection for consumers exposed to greater risk
when insurers are exposed to less risk than normal. The rule sets
forth a test to distinguish between those contracts where the
insurer bears more risk by paying a fixed amount, and those in which
purchasers bear more risk because they will receive a variable
amount that is dependent upon fluctuating stock market prices. The
panel concluded that such an approach in light of this risk
assessment was reasonable.
American Equity Investment Life Insurance Co. v.
SEC (DCCir) will be published in a forthcoming
Report.