An individual "used" counterfeit Louis Vuitton trademarks, for purposes of the criminal trademark counterfeiting statute (18 U.S.C. Sec. 2320) by purchasing knockoff handbags bearing a counterfeit "LV" logo in New York, and then carrying and transporting the goods in a motor vehicle, with the intent to sell them at his commercial venture in Indiana, the U.S. Court of Appeals in Philadelphia has held. "Use" did not require the individual to actively employ the mark by showing or displaying the goods bearing the counterfeit logo.

The "use" required by the statute was the use of the counterfeit mark, not use of the goods. The words "sale" and "sell" did not appear in the statute; rather, the statute more broadly referenced a commercial component by incorporating the word "traffics," and without limiting that term to the point of sale.

The word "use," by itself, did not require an actual or potential sales transaction, in the court's view. Congress intended the statute to control and prevent commercial counterfeiting by reaching a stream of illegal commerce and not simply its point of sale.

The counterfeit logo was "used," in the ordinary meaning of the word, by being attached to handbags. Although the goods were packaged in plastic bags during transit, the marked handbags were part of the individual's inventory, and he was able to enjoy the benefits of the counterfeit "LV" logos that were on the handbags, the court said.

Diallo, 3rd Cir., ¶61,472.